Court reviews whether plaintiff sufficiently established a cause of action to entitle it to a mechanic's lien on the property.

HEFFERLIN + KRONENBERG ARCHITECTS, PLLC, v. CLP DEVELOPMENT, LLC, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. April 9, 2012)

Plaintiff brought this action claiming, inter alia, that it was entitled to a mechanics' lien on the subject property. Defendant filed Motions to Dismiss, one ground being that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Trial Court subsequently ruled that the Complaint did not establish a cause of action to entitle plaintiff to a lien on the property. Plaintiff has appealed and we hold that upon review of the Complaint, and applying the rules governing the test of the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint, that the Complaint states a cause of action. We vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/hefferlinpllc_040912.pdf

Court reviews whether purchaser provided an adequate reason for terminating a contract

BOURLAND, HEFLIN, ALVAREZ, MINOR & MATTHEWS, PLC v. RODNEY HEATON and MARGARET HEATON and LOEB PROPERTIES (Tenn. Ct. App. April 9, 2012)

The parties entered into a Contract for the sale and purchase of commercial real estate, and the purchaser deposited $50,000.00 earnest money. The purchaser terminated the Contract, citing the economic downturn and the purchaser’s resulting inability to secure retail tenants for its planned development. The parties disputed whether such termination was appropriate under the Contract, and thus, whether the purchaser was entitled to a return of its earnest money.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the purchaser and further awarded the purchaser its attorney fees and expenses. We find the economic downturn did not provide an appropriate basis for termination of the Contract. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the purchaser, and we enter summary judgment in favor of the sellers. The sellers shall be awarded the $44,362.57 remaining in the escrow account, and the purchaser shall pay the sellers an additional $5,637.43, for a total of $50,000.00. Additionally, pursuant to the Contract, the sellers are awarded attorney fees and expenses incurred in both the trial court and in this Court, and we remand for a determination of such award.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/bourlandheflin_040912.pdf

Tennessee Supreme Court determines whether a city's ordinance substantially interferes with a firework dealer's use of land

SNPCO, INC. v. CITY OF JEFFERSON CITY ET AL. (Tenn. March 26, 2012)

This appeal involves the question of whether a city’s ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits implicates Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) (Supp. 2008) which permits pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a “zoning change.”

After the City of Jefferson City annexed the property on which a fireworks retailer’s business was located, the retailer filed suit in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) permitted it to continue to sell fireworks.

The trial court dismissed the retailer’s complaint in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, No. E2009-02355-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4272744, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2010). We granted the retailer’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to clarify the application of the “substantial interference” test in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466 (Tenn. 2004) to ordinances such as the one involved in this case.

We have determined that our decision in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville requires consideration of both the terms and effects of the challenged ordinance. Thus, the courts must first determine whether the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s “general plan of zoning.” If the courts determine that the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s general plan of zoning, then, and only then, may the courts ascertain whether the ordinance results in a “substantial interference” with the use of land.

Based on this record, we have determined that Jefferson City’s challenged ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits is not related to the city’s general plan of zoning. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the courts below.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/snpcoinc_032612.pdf

Court reviews whether members of a planning commission had conflicts of interest in a rezoning application

FRED H. GILLHAM v. CITY OF MT. PLEASANT, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 30, 2012)

A residential property owner challenged the procedures used by a planning commission and city commission in granting a rezoning application submitted by two industrial companies. The companies asked that the zoning for 95.2 acres of land be changed from agricultural to special impact industrial for the purpose of developing a landfill to dispose of salt cake produced as a byproduct of their smelting businesses. The property owner also asserted that two of the commissioners had a conflict of interest and that their participation granting the application invalidated the procedure. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motions after concluding the planning commission and city commission complied with the procedural requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§13-7-203(a) and 6-20-215 and that the two commissioners had no conflict of interest since they had no ownership interest in the rezoning applicants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the property owner’s complaint.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gillhamf_033012.pdf

Court Sides with Property Owners over EPA

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that property owners have a right to prompt review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) compliance orders that block activities on lands determined to be protected.

In the case, an Idaho couple contested the EPA’s determination that their lot contained wetlands regulated by the Clean Water Act. They also complained there was no reasonable way to challenge that determination without risking fines that could mount quickly.

The court rejected EPA's argument that allowing judicial review would compromise the agency's ability to deal with water pollution, allowing the couple to contest the EPA’s determination in federal court.

Read the full story at the Knoxville News Sentinel website.

Court reviews a claim to set aside a quitclaim deed

KATHRYN M. CLAIBORNE V. LARRY W. GOLDSTON (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 2012)

In this case, Kathryn M. Claiborne sought to set aside a quitclaim deed relating to property given to Larry W. Goldston. The trial court set aside the deed but awarded damages to Larry W. Goldston based upon his counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Kathryn M. Claiborne appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/claibornek_032812.pdf

Court reviews whether a lease guarantor was entitled to an interpreter who was not his co-defendant

MOHINDER N. SUD, v. MAN KENG HO, a/k/a SIMON HO, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 30, 2012)

The Trial Court held Man Keng Ho liable for unpaid rents on commercial property that Ho had leased from his landlord. Ho claimed against Soon Lee Pang, appellant, on the grounds that Pang was the guarantor on the lease. At the subsequent trial between Ho and Pang, Ho acting as an interpreter for Pang, the Trial Court entered Judgment against Pang for the full amount of the Judgment against Ho as guarantor under the terms of the lease.

Pang then filed a Rule 60 Motion seeking relief from the Judgment, principally on the grounds that he was entitled to an interpreter and the Trial Court erred in utilizing his co-defendant, who had an interest in the case, as Pang's interpreter. The Trial Court overruled the Rule 60 Motion and Pang appealed to this Court.

We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in not complying with Rules 41 and 42 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and remand for a retrial on the merits.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/sudm_033012.pdf

Court determines which of two deeds of trust has priority

EQUITY MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC. OF TENNESSEE ET AL. v. JOE BOB HAYNES (Tenn. Ct. App. March 21, 2012)

The issue in this case is which of two deeds of trust has priority. Deed of trust A was executed before deed of trust B was executed; A was also registered before B was registered, but after B was executed. We affirm the chancellor’s decision that A has priority over B and that equitable estoppel does not apply to change this result.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/equitymortgage_032112.pdf

Court reviews the enforceability of a real estate sales contract

CASEY E. BEVANS v. RHONDA BURGESS ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 20, 2012)

Prospective buyer who signed real estate sales contract sued seller, seller’s real estate agent and broker, and the actual buyers for breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and specific performance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that there was no enforceable contract. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/bevansc_032012.pdf

Court reviews an award of deficiency damages following a foreclosure sale

COMMERCIAL BANK, INC. v. RAYMOND E. LACY (Tenn. Ct. App. March 14, 2012)

This appeal results from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee bank. Appellant defaulted on promissory notes executed in favor of Appellee, resulting in a foreclosure sale. After the sale, a foreclosure deficiency existed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, awarding deficiency damages including amounts for unpaid taxes on the property. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/lacyr_031412.pdf

Court reviews whether a re-zoned are was improperly classified due to "spot zoning"

ADELAIDA FIELDING ET AL. v. THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF LYNCHBURG, MOORE COUNTY, TENNESSEE ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. February 1, 2012)

The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a re-zoning ordinance on the grounds that it constitutes illegal "spot zoning," and that the re-zoned area was improperly classified in violation of the local general zoning ordinance. The trial court upheld the re-zoning ordinance, finding it was enacted in furtherance of public safety goals and that the re-zoning classification was reasonable and rational. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/fieldinga_020112.pdf

Tennessee Joins Agreement with Major Financial Institutions

Tennessee will participate in the $25 billion agreement with the nation’s five largest mortgage servicers, according to Attorney General Bob Cooper. The agreement arises from an investigation into unacceptable nationwide mortgage servicing and foreclosure practices. The servicers participating in this agreement, which was announced today, are Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citi, GMAC/Ally Financial, and Wells Fargo.

Once approved by the court, the agreement will provide an estimated $146 million in relief to Tennessee homeowners and addresses future mortgage loan servicing practices.

“This agreement avoids protracted and costly litigation while providing significant and tangible relief to distressed homeowners,” said Cooper. “The benefits of this agreement today far outweigh the possible benefits that might be obtained after several years in court. Homeowners need the help now and an orderly resolution of these claims is in everyone’s interests.”

Read the full article at:
http://www.tba2.org/tbatoday/news/2012/mortgageagreement_020912.pdf

Court reviews a malicious prosecution case that arose out of a dispute between neighbors

JAMES COLEMAN v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL. STEVE SANDERS, SHERIFF OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY; AND HARRY R. HOPKINS, JR., DEPUTY SHERIFF OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY (Tenn. Ct. App. February 15, 2012)

This is a malicious prosecution case arising out of a dispute between neighbors. A dispute arose when the plaintiff neighbor hired a tree service to trim the branches of a tree near the border between the two neighbors' properties. After a confrontation, the police were called. After they arrived, the police cited both neighbors on charges of disorderly conduct. After the charges against the plaintiff neighbor were dismissed, he filed this malicious prosecution action against the defendant county and two of the police officers involved. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff neighbor now appeals. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/colemanj_021512.pdf

Lance Coleman: Hilton loses property tax exemption, ordered to pay $60,000 in back taxes (KNS)

Land the Airport Hilton sits on is exempt from property taxes, but a state judge has ruled the building out of which the business operates is not exempt, and that translates into about $30,000 a year the hotel now will be required to pay in property taxes.

Blount County Property Assessor Mike Morton announced the recent ruling affecting the Alcoa Highway hotel on Wednesday.

Administrative Law Judge Brook Thompson handed down the ruling resulting in Blount County receiving at least $30,000 in property taxes annually from the Hilton. Morton said he made the ruling public Wednesday because of the upcoming budget decisions for fiscal 2012-2013.

Full article located at: http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/feb/08/hilton-loses-property-tax-exemption-ordered-to/

Court reviews the award of an easement in a boundary line dispute

MICHAEL HONG v. LEROY FOUST, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. February 8, 2012)

In this boundary line dispute, the defendants sought to claim property beyond a road known as "Creek Road." The trial court concluded that the road constituted the defendants' southern boundary.

However, because the plaintiff's complaint sought the adoption of a survey that conceded a small strip of land south of Creek Road to the defendants, along with the fact that the plaintiff testified that he believed that the defendants owned some property south of Creek Road, the trial court granted the defendants a strip alongside the road about four feet deep.

After the defendants moved to conform their pleading to the proof and sought relief under the doctrine of adverse possession, the trial court reopened the proof to consider adverse use. Another opinion was issued awarding the defendants a strip extending approximately ten feet from the southern edge of Creek Road. The defendants appeal. We affirm the findings of the trial court.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/hongm_020812.pdf