SMITH COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION v. CARVER TRUCKING, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2012)
This appeal involves a contempt finding against a closely-held corporation. The defendant closely-held corporation owned real property located on a highway.
The trial court held that the corporation had violated zoning ordinances by maintaining and operating a trucking terminal and salvage yard in an unauthorized area. The trial court enjoined the corporation from maintaining a trucking terminal at this location and directed the corporation to remove junk from the property. The corporation then leased the property to a business associate who continued to operate a trucking terminal on the property and failed to remove the junk. A contempt petition was filed against the defendant corporation.
The trial court determined that the defendant corporation had violated the injunction and was in contempt of court. The defendant corporation now appeals, arguing that the corporation cannot be held in contempt for the actions of the tenant on the property. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/smithplanning_071212.pdf
Showing posts with label zoning. Show all posts
Showing posts with label zoning. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 17, 2012
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
Tennessee Supreme Court determines whether a city's ordinance substantially interferes with a firework dealer's use of land
SNPCO, INC. v. CITY OF JEFFERSON CITY ET AL. (Tenn. March 26, 2012)
This appeal involves the question of whether a city’s ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits implicates Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) (Supp. 2008) which permits pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a “zoning change.”
After the City of Jefferson City annexed the property on which a fireworks retailer’s business was located, the retailer filed suit in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) permitted it to continue to sell fireworks.
The trial court dismissed the retailer’s complaint in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, No. E2009-02355-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4272744, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2010). We granted the retailer’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to clarify the application of the “substantial interference” test in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466 (Tenn. 2004) to ordinances such as the one involved in this case.
We have determined that our decision in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville requires consideration of both the terms and effects of the challenged ordinance. Thus, the courts must first determine whether the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s “general plan of zoning.” If the courts determine that the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s general plan of zoning, then, and only then, may the courts ascertain whether the ordinance results in a “substantial interference” with the use of land.
Based on this record, we have determined that Jefferson City’s challenged ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits is not related to the city’s general plan of zoning. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the courts below.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/snpcoinc_032612.pdf
This appeal involves the question of whether a city’s ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits implicates Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) (Supp. 2008) which permits pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a “zoning change.”
After the City of Jefferson City annexed the property on which a fireworks retailer’s business was located, the retailer filed suit in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) permitted it to continue to sell fireworks.
The trial court dismissed the retailer’s complaint in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, No. E2009-02355-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4272744, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2010). We granted the retailer’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to clarify the application of the “substantial interference” test in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466 (Tenn. 2004) to ordinances such as the one involved in this case.
We have determined that our decision in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville requires consideration of both the terms and effects of the challenged ordinance. Thus, the courts must first determine whether the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s “general plan of zoning.” If the courts determine that the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s general plan of zoning, then, and only then, may the courts ascertain whether the ordinance results in a “substantial interference” with the use of land.
Based on this record, we have determined that Jefferson City’s challenged ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits is not related to the city’s general plan of zoning. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the courts below.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/snpcoinc_032612.pdf
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
Court reviews whether members of a planning commission had conflicts of interest in a rezoning application
FRED H. GILLHAM v. CITY OF MT. PLEASANT, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 30, 2012)
A residential property owner challenged the procedures used by a planning commission and city commission in granting a rezoning application submitted by two industrial companies. The companies asked that the zoning for 95.2 acres of land be changed from agricultural to special impact industrial for the purpose of developing a landfill to dispose of salt cake produced as a byproduct of their smelting businesses. The property owner also asserted that two of the commissioners had a conflict of interest and that their participation granting the application invalidated the procedure. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motions after concluding the planning commission and city commission complied with the procedural requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§13-7-203(a) and 6-20-215 and that the two commissioners had no conflict of interest since they had no ownership interest in the rezoning applicants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the property owner’s complaint.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gillhamf_033012.pdf
A residential property owner challenged the procedures used by a planning commission and city commission in granting a rezoning application submitted by two industrial companies. The companies asked that the zoning for 95.2 acres of land be changed from agricultural to special impact industrial for the purpose of developing a landfill to dispose of salt cake produced as a byproduct of their smelting businesses. The property owner also asserted that two of the commissioners had a conflict of interest and that their participation granting the application invalidated the procedure. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The trial court granted the defendants’ motions after concluding the planning commission and city commission complied with the procedural requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§13-7-203(a) and 6-20-215 and that the two commissioners had no conflict of interest since they had no ownership interest in the rezoning applicants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the property owner’s complaint.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gillhamf_033012.pdf
Friday, February 24, 2012
Court reviews whether a re-zoned are was improperly classified due to "spot zoning"
ADELAIDA FIELDING ET AL. v. THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF LYNCHBURG, MOORE COUNTY, TENNESSEE ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. February 1, 2012)
The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a re-zoning ordinance on the grounds that it constitutes illegal "spot zoning," and that the re-zoned area was improperly classified in violation of the local general zoning ordinance. The trial court upheld the re-zoning ordinance, finding it was enacted in furtherance of public safety goals and that the re-zoning classification was reasonable and rational. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/fieldinga_020112.pdf
The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a re-zoning ordinance on the grounds that it constitutes illegal "spot zoning," and that the re-zoned area was improperly classified in violation of the local general zoning ordinance. The trial court upheld the re-zoning ordinance, finding it was enacted in furtherance of public safety goals and that the re-zoning classification was reasonable and rational. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/fieldinga_020112.pdf
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
Court reviews whether the Knoxville City Council can review the Board of Zoning Appeals's decisions.
ANITA J. CASH, CITY OF KNOXVILLE ZONING COORDINATOR, v. ED WHEELER (Tenn. Ct. App. August 16, 2011)
The City of Knoxville Board of Zoning Appeals granted defendant a variance and the Knoxville City Council then nullified the variance granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals. Defendant then appealed to the Chancery Court of Knox County contending that the city ordinance which permitted the City Council to review the decisions of the Board of Zoning Appeals was invalid, and the Chancellor agreed. On appeal, we hold that the ordinance at issue is valid under the State's statutory scheme. We reverse the Chancellor and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/casha_081611.pdf
The City of Knoxville Board of Zoning Appeals granted defendant a variance and the Knoxville City Council then nullified the variance granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals. Defendant then appealed to the Chancery Court of Knox County contending that the city ordinance which permitted the City Council to review the decisions of the Board of Zoning Appeals was invalid, and the Chancellor agreed. On appeal, we hold that the ordinance at issue is valid under the State's statutory scheme. We reverse the Chancellor and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/casha_081611.pdf
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Court reviews a zoning board's decision to deny a permissible use permit for rural property
JERRY KITTRELL v. WILSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 4, 2011)
The owner of a piece of rural property in Wilson County applied for a "permissible use" permit that would allow him to display vehicles for sale on the property. The County planning staff recommended against issuance of a permit, reasoning that the proposed use was not consistent with other uses permitted in an A-1 (agricultural) zoning district. The owner appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which agreed to issue the permit, but limited the use to "no more than 10 serviceable items being on the property at any given time."
The owner challenged the limitation by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Wilson County Chancery Court. The court determined that the BZA had acted arbitrarily and had exceeded its authority by placing a condition on the owner's use of the property of a type not contemplated by the controlling ordinance, and it removed that condition. We affirm the removal of the condition, but we reverse the trial court's holding that the BZA had violated the property owner's substantive due process rights.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/kittrellj_080411.pdf
The owner of a piece of rural property in Wilson County applied for a "permissible use" permit that would allow him to display vehicles for sale on the property. The County planning staff recommended against issuance of a permit, reasoning that the proposed use was not consistent with other uses permitted in an A-1 (agricultural) zoning district. The owner appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which agreed to issue the permit, but limited the use to "no more than 10 serviceable items being on the property at any given time."
The owner challenged the limitation by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Wilson County Chancery Court. The court determined that the BZA had acted arbitrarily and had exceeded its authority by placing a condition on the owner's use of the property of a type not contemplated by the controlling ordinance, and it removed that condition. We affirm the removal of the condition, but we reverse the trial court's holding that the BZA had violated the property owner's substantive due process rights.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/kittrellj_080411.pdf
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Court reviews whether a city is estopped from refusing to re-zone property based on a verbal commitment
STONEYBROOK GOLF COURSE, LLC v. CITY OF COLUMBIA (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2010)
Stoneybrook Golf Course, LLC, purchased approximately 190 acres of land ("the Property") - on part of which was located a golf course - with plans to develop the vacant land surrounding the course. Before purchasing the Property, Stoneybrook met with the mayor and other officials of the City of Columbia and received their verbal assurances of strong support for the annexation of the 190 acres into the City and the re-zoning of the area to permit the building of condominiums.
After Stoneybrook purchased the Property, the city council of Columbia refused to go forward with the annexation and re-zoning until a comprehensive land use plan could be completed against which to evaluate the proposed re-zoning. Stoneybrook filed this action against the City, claiming, in essence, that the City's refusal to act promptly in accord with the verbal "commitment" constitutes an unconstitutional moratorium and, alternatively, that the City is estopped from refusing to re-zone the Property. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings. Stoneybrook appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/stoneybrook_072710.pdf
Stoneybrook Golf Course, LLC, purchased approximately 190 acres of land ("the Property") - on part of which was located a golf course - with plans to develop the vacant land surrounding the course. Before purchasing the Property, Stoneybrook met with the mayor and other officials of the City of Columbia and received their verbal assurances of strong support for the annexation of the 190 acres into the City and the re-zoning of the area to permit the building of condominiums.
After Stoneybrook purchased the Property, the city council of Columbia refused to go forward with the annexation and re-zoning until a comprehensive land use plan could be completed against which to evaluate the proposed re-zoning. Stoneybrook filed this action against the City, claiming, in essence, that the City's refusal to act promptly in accord with the verbal "commitment" constitutes an unconstitutional moratorium and, alternatively, that the City is estopped from refusing to re-zone the Property. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings. Stoneybrook appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/stoneybrook_072710.pdf
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