GRAND VALLEY LAKES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. DENNIS BURROW (Tenn. Ct. App. December 28, 2011)
Appellant, the owner of several lots in a subdivision managed and maintained by the Appellee home owners association, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the question of whether Appellant owed an increase in dues and fees on his lots, and the denial of his counter-claims for fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, outrageous conduct, and invalidity of the restrictive covenants on grounds that these causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation or the doctrine of laches.
We conclude that the Appellee followed the correct procedure in amending its restrictive covenants to increase the amount of dues. However, because the trial court did not make findings, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, concerning the grounds for its application of laches, we cannot review the question of whether Appellant's counter-claims were properly dismissed. Vacated and remanded.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/grandvalley_122811.pdf
The Tennessee Real Estate Law Blog is published by the Adams Law Firm, a full-service law firm with offices in Knoxville and Nashville, Tennessee.
Wednesday, December 28, 2011
Tuesday, December 27, 2011
Court reviews a case involving the alleged fraudulent concealment of flooding in a house that was sold by defendants
G. KENNETH CAMPBELL ET AL. v. JAMES E. HUDDLESTON ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 27, 2011)
James E. Huddleston and his wife, Patricia M. Huddleston ("the Sellers"), sold their house to G. Kenneth Campbell and his wife, Teresa J. Campbell ("the Buyers"). The Buyers inquired of the Sellers as to whether there had been flooding in the house. The Sellers disclosed that there had been one flood in the basement to a depth of six inches.
During the course of some later renovations, the Buyers became aware the Sellers had indicated, on a wall stud, that there had been a 1998 flood in the basement to a depth of 38 inches. They also learned the Sellers had made an insurance claim for another flood in 2003 that was nearly one-foot deep.
The Buyers filed this tort action sounding in fraudulent concealment and fraudulent misrepresentation. The Sellers filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, since the Buyers were made aware of the one "six inch" flood, they could not have relied on the misrepresentations with respect to the full extent of the two flooding events. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The Buyers appeal. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings before a different trial judge.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/campbellg_122711.pdf
James E. Huddleston and his wife, Patricia M. Huddleston ("the Sellers"), sold their house to G. Kenneth Campbell and his wife, Teresa J. Campbell ("the Buyers"). The Buyers inquired of the Sellers as to whether there had been flooding in the house. The Sellers disclosed that there had been one flood in the basement to a depth of six inches.
During the course of some later renovations, the Buyers became aware the Sellers had indicated, on a wall stud, that there had been a 1998 flood in the basement to a depth of 38 inches. They also learned the Sellers had made an insurance claim for another flood in 2003 that was nearly one-foot deep.
The Buyers filed this tort action sounding in fraudulent concealment and fraudulent misrepresentation. The Sellers filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, since the Buyers were made aware of the one "six inch" flood, they could not have relied on the misrepresentations with respect to the full extent of the two flooding events. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The Buyers appeal. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings before a different trial judge.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/campbellg_122711.pdf
Monday, December 26, 2011
Court determines the existence of an easement
CHARLIE LEE INGRAM v. REBECCA AND RANDY WASSON (Tenn. Ct. App. December 22, 2011)
This appeal concerns the existence of an easement. The dispute between the two adjoining landowners began after the defendant landowners blocked the plaintiff neighboring landowner's access to a roadway crossing over the defendants' property. The plaintiff landowner filed this action seeking condemnation or a finding of an implied easement for access to the roadway over the defendants' property, arguing that his property was landlocked. Upon the admission into evidence of several affidavits, the trial court found both an easement implied from prior use and, in the alternative, an easement created by necessity. The defendant landowners now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/ingramc_112211.pdf
This appeal concerns the existence of an easement. The dispute between the two adjoining landowners began after the defendant landowners blocked the plaintiff neighboring landowner's access to a roadway crossing over the defendants' property. The plaintiff landowner filed this action seeking condemnation or a finding of an implied easement for access to the roadway over the defendants' property, arguing that his property was landlocked. Upon the admission into evidence of several affidavits, the trial court found both an easement implied from prior use and, in the alternative, an easement created by necessity. The defendant landowners now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/ingramc_112211.pdf
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Court reviews whether plantiff properly exercised its right to terminate a contract for the sale of real property
CAMERON GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC. v. KINGSTON PIKE, LLC (Tenn. Ct. App. December 21, 2011)
Cameron General Contractors, Inc., a Nebraska corporation ("Cameron"), sued Kingston Pike, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company ("Kingston Pike"), for breach of a contract concerning the sale of real property located in Knoxville, Tennessee. Prior to trial, Cameron elected to exercise its contractual right to terminate the contract, and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the contract did not limit Cameron to the return of its earnest money, and granting Cameron a judgment against Kingston Pike for damages in the amount of $872,418.22, plus attorney's fees of $137,656.56. Kingston Pike appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the contract at issue clearly and unambiguously provides that once Cameron chose to terminate the contract, Cameron's sole remedy for Kingston Pike's breach was a return of Cameron's earnest money deposit. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court's October 28, 2010 order.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/cameron_122111.pdf
Cameron General Contractors, Inc., a Nebraska corporation ("Cameron"), sued Kingston Pike, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company ("Kingston Pike"), for breach of a contract concerning the sale of real property located in Knoxville, Tennessee. Prior to trial, Cameron elected to exercise its contractual right to terminate the contract, and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the contract did not limit Cameron to the return of its earnest money, and granting Cameron a judgment against Kingston Pike for damages in the amount of $872,418.22, plus attorney's fees of $137,656.56. Kingston Pike appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the contract at issue clearly and unambiguously provides that once Cameron chose to terminate the contract, Cameron's sole remedy for Kingston Pike's breach was a return of Cameron's earnest money deposit. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court's October 28, 2010 order.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/cameron_122111.pdf
Court reviews whether plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to sign a sewer easement agreement with the City of Memphis
FRANCES SEWARD BENNETT and DON SEWARD v. CITY OF MEMPHIS (Tenn. Ct. App. December 21, 2011)
Plaintiffs sued the City of Memphis, claiming that they were fraudulently induced to sign a sewer easement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Memphis. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/bennettf_122111.pdf
Plaintiffs sued the City of Memphis, claiming that they were fraudulently induced to sign a sewer easement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Memphis. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/bennettf_122111.pdf
Labels:
easement,
Fraudulent Inducement,
Memphis,
Sewer,
TN Court of Appeals
Thursday, December 1, 2011
Court reviews a breach of contract claim against a landlord
JOHN RUFF v. REDDOCH MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 1, 2011)
Tenant filed suit against his former landlord and the current owner of premises that tenant leased alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Trial court dismissed tenant's claim against the former landlord holding that the landlord was exempt from suit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 66-28-305. The court dismissed the claim against the current owner because tenant failed to comply with the fourteen day pre-suit notice requirement at Tenn. Code Ann. section 66-28-501(a). Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/ruffj_120111.pdf
Tenant filed suit against his former landlord and the current owner of premises that tenant leased alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Trial court dismissed tenant's claim against the former landlord holding that the landlord was exempt from suit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 66-28-305. The court dismissed the claim against the current owner because tenant failed to comply with the fourteen day pre-suit notice requirement at Tenn. Code Ann. section 66-28-501(a). Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/ruffj_120111.pdf
Monday, November 28, 2011
Court reviews a nuisance lawsuit involving a loud Air Conditioning Condenser Unit
CHANDRA PEARSON v. VICTOR ROSS (Tenn. Ct. App. December 28, 2011)
This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The parties own adjoining homes in a neighborhood of zero-lot line homes. The defendant's air conditioning condenser unit is outside his home, between the parties' homes. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the noise of the defendant's air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance, and seeking abatement of the nuisance, money damages, and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/pearsonc_122811.pdf
This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The parties own adjoining homes in a neighborhood of zero-lot line homes. The defendant's air conditioning condenser unit is outside his home, between the parties' homes. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the noise of the defendant's air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance, and seeking abatement of the nuisance, money damages, and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/pearsonc_122811.pdf
Thursday, November 17, 2011
Determination of Navigability and Ownership of Land Beneath a River
Determination of Navigability and Ownership of Land Beneath a River (TN Attorney General Opinions, November 17, 2011)
In this opinion, the Attorney General discussed the following questions:
1. When is a river legally deemed navigable, and how does such a determination affect ownership of the land beneath the river?
2. Assuming a river is deemed navigable by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, then is the river navigable in a legal sense?
Question 1
After discussing the applicable case law, the Attorney General concluded that whether a waterway is legally navigable is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. The AG states that the legal navigability of a waterway determines whether the land beneath the water may be privately owned--if the waterway is not legally navigable, the land beneath it may be privately owned, but if it is navigable, the bed of the waterway, to the low-water mark, is publicly owned by the State. However, the public maintains a right to "free and uninterrupted use" of the waterway for purposes of transportation and navigation even if a waterway is deemed non-navigable.
Question 2
With regards to the second question, the Attorney General refers to the Code of Federal Regulations, which states that determinations of navigability by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is binding on the Corps, but not on federal courts. He then refers to the Tennessee Court of Appeals' City of Murfreesboro v. Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc. case, which concludes that if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' decision cannot bind federal courts, it also cannot bind state courts. Thus, although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' determination of navigability can be considered by a jury, the jury is not bound by that determination and may find contrary to the Corps' determination.
The AG's opinion can be read in its entirety at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2011/ag_11_75.pdf
In this opinion, the Attorney General discussed the following questions:
1. When is a river legally deemed navigable, and how does such a determination affect ownership of the land beneath the river?
2. Assuming a river is deemed navigable by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, then is the river navigable in a legal sense?
Question 1
After discussing the applicable case law, the Attorney General concluded that whether a waterway is legally navigable is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. The AG states that the legal navigability of a waterway determines whether the land beneath the water may be privately owned--if the waterway is not legally navigable, the land beneath it may be privately owned, but if it is navigable, the bed of the waterway, to the low-water mark, is publicly owned by the State. However, the public maintains a right to "free and uninterrupted use" of the waterway for purposes of transportation and navigation even if a waterway is deemed non-navigable.
Question 2
With regards to the second question, the Attorney General refers to the Code of Federal Regulations, which states that determinations of navigability by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is binding on the Corps, but not on federal courts. He then refers to the Tennessee Court of Appeals' City of Murfreesboro v. Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc. case, which concludes that if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' decision cannot bind federal courts, it also cannot bind state courts. Thus, although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' determination of navigability can be considered by a jury, the jury is not bound by that determination and may find contrary to the Corps' determination.
The AG's opinion can be read in its entirety at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2011/ag_11_75.pdf
Court reviews a mortgage priority dispute involving a scrivener's error on the deed of trust
ABN AMRO MORTGAGE GROUP, INC. v. SOUTHERN SECURITY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION (Tenn. Ct. App. November 17, 2011)
Appellant, the second mortgage holder on the subject property, appeals the trial court's determination that Appellee held a valid first mortgage on the property, when Appellee's mortgage was taken under a deed of trust that contained a scrivener's error that incorrectly identified the property's lot number.
The trial court held that: (1) the scrivener's error was not fatal to Appellant's deed of trust as the instrument otherwise clearly identified the property; (2) Appellant's mortgage was superior to Appellee's; and (3) Appellee's bid at Appellant's foreclosure sale created a valid contract, under which Appellee owed Appellant the purchase price. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/abnamro_111711.pdf
Appellant, the second mortgage holder on the subject property, appeals the trial court's determination that Appellee held a valid first mortgage on the property, when Appellee's mortgage was taken under a deed of trust that contained a scrivener's error that incorrectly identified the property's lot number.
The trial court held that: (1) the scrivener's error was not fatal to Appellant's deed of trust as the instrument otherwise clearly identified the property; (2) Appellant's mortgage was superior to Appellee's; and (3) Appellee's bid at Appellant's foreclosure sale created a valid contract, under which Appellee owed Appellant the purchase price. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/abnamro_111711.pdf
Wednesday, October 26, 2011
Making Like-Kind Exchanges (1031) in Real Estate Used for Business or Investment
If you have real estate used for business or investment, you may exchange that property for another of “like kind” without recognizing a gain or loss under the tax codes. IRS Code Section 1031 provides for the exchange. There must be a “qualified intermediary” between the exchangers, a role that we are happy to perform at the Adams Law Firm. Please give us a call, if you are interested in learning more about this transaction.
Find more information at the IRS website: http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/industries/article/0,,id=98491,00.html
Find more information at the IRS website: http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/industries/article/0,,id=98491,00.html
Friday, September 30, 2011
Court determines the rightful owner of real property following the death of one of the tenants
RICHARD RHODEN v. DONALD D. RHODEN (Tenn. Ct. App. September 29, 2011)
This is an action for unlawful detainer. The property at issue was deeded to the plaintiff and his father "as tenants in common with the right of survivorship." For a time, the father, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's brother all lived together on the property. The father died intestate. After the father's death, the plaintiff asked his brother to leave the property, and the brother refused. The plaintiff then filed this action against his brother for unlawful detainer, claiming that he was the sole owner of the property after their father's death based on his right of survivorship. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed and held in favor of the plaintiff. The brother now appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/rhodenr_092911.pdf
This is an action for unlawful detainer. The property at issue was deeded to the plaintiff and his father "as tenants in common with the right of survivorship." For a time, the father, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's brother all lived together on the property. The father died intestate. After the father's death, the plaintiff asked his brother to leave the property, and the brother refused. The plaintiff then filed this action against his brother for unlawful detainer, claiming that he was the sole owner of the property after their father's death based on his right of survivorship. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed and held in favor of the plaintiff. The brother now appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/rhodenr_092911.pdf
Thursday, September 29, 2011
Court reviews an action to recover litigation expenses in a case to quiet title to a portion of property
DAVID DAWSON JOHNSON v. MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. September 29, 2011)
Madison County allegedly erroneously mis-assigned and sold a portion of Appellant's property. Many years later, in 2006, Appellant learned of the alleged mistake and filed suit to quiet title against Madison County, two former owners, and the then-current property owner. In 2010, the matter was settled prior to trial, and the property was returned to Appellant. Appellant then filed suit against Madison County seeking to recover his litigation expenses incurred in the action to quiet title. The trial court, however, dismissed his claims as time-barred. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/johnsond_092911.pdf
Madison County allegedly erroneously mis-assigned and sold a portion of Appellant's property. Many years later, in 2006, Appellant learned of the alleged mistake and filed suit to quiet title against Madison County, two former owners, and the then-current property owner. In 2010, the matter was settled prior to trial, and the property was returned to Appellant. Appellant then filed suit against Madison County seeking to recover his litigation expenses incurred in the action to quiet title. The trial court, however, dismissed his claims as time-barred. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/johnsond_092911.pdf
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Court reviews the most appropriate equitable remedy for a parcel of land passed by a decedent to his heirs
WANDA LEAVER WILLIAMS ET AL. v. BRANDON LEAVER ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. September 28, 2011)
The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/williamsw_092811.pdf
The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/williamsw_092811.pdf
Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Court reviews whether a landlord had a duty under a commercial lease to repair a tenant's leaky roof
C.F. PROPERTY, LLC v. RACHEL SCOTT ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. September 27, 2011)
This is a landlord-tenant dispute involving commercial property with a known and disclosed "leaky roof." The lease states that the "property" is leased "as is where is." In an email sent prior to the execution of the lease, the landlord stated it would "talk about" repairing the roof after the first year. The leakage increased dramatically after the first year. The tenant began withholding rent.
The landlord filed an unlawful detainer action and the tenant filed a counterclaim for damages resulting from the leaky roof. A bench trial ensured. The court held that, by telling the tenant it would "talk about" repairing the roof, the landlord misrepresented that the roof was repairable when the landlord knew it could not be repaired, and that the landlord had a duty under the lease to repair the roof. The landlord appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of the damages due the landlord under the lease.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/CFProperty_092711.pdf
This is a landlord-tenant dispute involving commercial property with a known and disclosed "leaky roof." The lease states that the "property" is leased "as is where is." In an email sent prior to the execution of the lease, the landlord stated it would "talk about" repairing the roof after the first year. The leakage increased dramatically after the first year. The tenant began withholding rent.
The landlord filed an unlawful detainer action and the tenant filed a counterclaim for damages resulting from the leaky roof. A bench trial ensured. The court held that, by telling the tenant it would "talk about" repairing the roof, the landlord misrepresented that the roof was repairable when the landlord knew it could not be repaired, and that the landlord had a duty under the lease to repair the roof. The landlord appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of the damages due the landlord under the lease.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/CFProperty_092711.pdf
Monday, September 19, 2011
Court reviews the enforceability of a purchase and sales agreement and who is liable for its breach
ROSS H. TARVER, et al., v. OCOEE LAND HOLDINGS, LLC., et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. September 19, 2011)
Plaintiffs sued defendants on a sale of real estate contract wherein defendants agreed to purchase certain real estate located in Polk County from plaintiffs for a stated price. Defendants joined issue on the pleadings in the trial before the Trial Judge.
The Trial Court held that the purchase and sales agreement was enforceable, and refused to find Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC liable for breach of the purchase and sales agreement, but held Glen Fetzner personally liable. Defendants and plaintiffs have appealed.
On appeal, we hold that the purchase and sales agreement was an enforceable contract, but the Court erred when it held Glen Fetzner personally liable for the breach of the purchase and sales agreement, and the Trial Court also erred when it did not find Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC liable for the breach of the contract. We enter Judgment against Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/tarverr_091911.pdf
Plaintiffs sued defendants on a sale of real estate contract wherein defendants agreed to purchase certain real estate located in Polk County from plaintiffs for a stated price. Defendants joined issue on the pleadings in the trial before the Trial Judge.
The Trial Court held that the purchase and sales agreement was enforceable, and refused to find Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC liable for breach of the purchase and sales agreement, but held Glen Fetzner personally liable. Defendants and plaintiffs have appealed.
On appeal, we hold that the purchase and sales agreement was an enforceable contract, but the Court erred when it held Glen Fetzner personally liable for the breach of the purchase and sales agreement, and the Trial Court also erred when it did not find Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC liable for the breach of the contract. We enter Judgment against Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/tarverr_091911.pdf
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)